From a purely technical standpoint, the rippling explosions of thousands of exploding beepers in the hands of Hezbollah represented an extraordinary feat of sabotage, one of the most remarkable in the history of the dark arts. That Israel, if that was the one behind the attacks, penetrated the Iranian and Hezbollah supply chains on such a large scale and with such violent effect is simply astonishing.

The question, as always, is what is the strategic effect? ​​How will this act of violence, however spectacular, shape the ongoing war between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran? It could well lead to the catastrophic conflict that many have warned about, as Hezbollah rains tens of thousands of rockets on Israeli cities while Israeli armored divisions sweep into Lebanon, sending hundreds of thousands, or even millions, fleeing north. The ensuing devastation and civilian casualties could be immense.

Or maybe not.

It has long been clear that neither Hezbollah nor Iran has any appetite for such an apocalyptic struggle at this point. After all, they could have chosen to wage it in recent years. If Hezbollah is beaten up in the same way that Hamas was, Iran will lose its most effective ally against Israel and, by extension, the United States. And to seek open war, Hezbollah would have to be prepared to sacrifice the Lebanese Shiite population from which it emerged, as well as its own cadres of fighters. Both Iran and Hezbollah must know that Israel now thinks it is fighting an existential struggle, with different rules.

Within Israel, it is striking that so many, even on the dovish end of the spectrum, believe that a major war of this kind with Hezbollah is not only inevitable but necessary. Many Israelis see the status quo—tens of thousands of Israeli civilians expelled from the border area, the border itself depopulated, and a constant, deadly rain of rockets from the north—as unacceptable. And it is. The war along Israel’s northern border, or at least the phase of the war that Hezbollah launched after October 7, had nothing to do with direct Israeli behavior and everything to do with claiming credit for participation, belatedly, in the campaign launched from Gaza that day. It is part of a strategy, conceived in Tehran but executed from Beirut, to undermine Israeli morale and the will to fight, with a view to eradicating the Jewish state.

If a much bigger war breaks out now, that is a risk that the Israeli leaders have taken. If they fight the war without restraint, they will not encounter much resistance from the population.

In many other ways, however, this is a strategic victory for Israel. Set aside the thousands of Hezbollah operatives disabled or killed by these explosions and consider the psychological effect. Hezbollah members are now unlikely to trust any form of electronics: car keys, cell phones, computers, televisions. Myths and legends, no doubt reinforced by an information warfare campaign, will enhance Israel’s success in penetrating black boxes, no matter how large or small. An army wary of any form of electronics is a paralyzed army: an individual leader, like Hamas’s Yahya Sinwar, can communicate without a telephone, but an entire organization cannot.

The Iranians, already reeling from the assassination of the Hamas political leader in a Revolutionary Guard guest house on the day of the new president’s inauguration, now have much to ponder. How, they must ask, did the Israelis penetrate the supply chain? How did they get access to the beepers? How did they know this consignment was going to Hezbollah? How did they manage to thwart all the security measures that had been put in place?

After such a major failure, witch hunts will follow, no doubt fueled by a vigorous information warfare campaign. Organizations looking for spies and saboteurs, especially after such a disaster, are unlikely to be forgiving or relentless, and so a spiral of accusations, torture, and executions is likely to ensue. War is as much a matter of the mind as anything else. By demonstrating its extraordinary reach, Israel will create internal fear and suspicion that can be more paralyzing than fear of an enemy.

The Middle East is witnessing a coalition war. Israel’s silent partners include Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan. For them, this coup is confirmation that Israel can be a capable partner. The German word alliance captures a quality of being worthy of being an ally; in this case, the cloak of mystery and surprise, which plays on Israel’s existing reputation for successful villainy, makes Israel alliance indeed.

For a country that has endured a gruelling year-long war, punctuated by the deaths of soldiers and, even more poignantly, the killing of hostages shortly before they could be freed, this will be a huge morale boost. That is also a major benefit of this operation, and one that should not be underestimated.

There is a message here for the United States and other countries. The Israelis have learned the hard way to ask forgiveness rather than permission, to act on their own when necessary. Ironically, such a reputation increases a country’s influence over its superpower, making the latter more motivated to take the concerns of its smaller partner into account.

Finally, there is a large community that must remain in the shadows, and that encourages the Israelis. In 1984, Hezbollah kidnapped William Francis Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut. They tortured him for 15 months before handing him over to a Palestinian group to be executed. A tape of his shattered body and mind found its way to Washington. The CIA has never forgotten that. Nor have other intelligence agencies around the world that work against Hezbollah and against Iran. As professionals, they approve of bold and well-executed attacks on that organization, and the goodwill that comes from that is not to be sneezed at either.

No one knows where all this will lead. A very large war could break out, or, as after recent assassinations, Hezbollah and Iran could resort to ineffective or symbolic responses. Some will doubtless think that this is another reckless Israeli act, or deplore violence because it is ineffective, but they are wrong. All the evidence suggests that this was a deliberate act—and extensive but targeted violence, whether we like it or not, can produce results. This act, and others, has shifted the balance of fear—however much and for however long—in the Middle East. For Israel, a country that lives in a very difficult neighborhood, that is a good thing.