NNow that the dust has literally settled on the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, it’s crucial to ask whether this deal will last – because let’s face it, we’ve been here before.

In 2006, Hezbollah and Israel fought brutally for more than a month for reasons not much different from the current context. By carrying out a cross-border attack on Israeli forces, Hezbollah sought to relieve some pressure on Hamas, which was fighting Israel in Gaza. The operation failed, sparking a devastating conflict that led to the deaths of approximately 1,100 Lebanese and 160 Israelis, as well as mass displacement and damage to infrastructure in southern Lebanon. Domestically, Hezbollah was heavily criticized by most of Lebanese society for its unilateral decision, but as always, it evaded responsibility thanks to its weapons.

That time, a combination of military fatigue, the lack of an exit strategy, and US-led international pressure ended hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah on August 14. However, no solid plan was devised to prevent the fighting from happening again.

UN Resolution 1701 called for the right things: the deployment of Lebanese troops and UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon, the withdrawal of the Israeli army and Hezbollah from the same area and the disarmament of the latter – but virtually none of this has been achieved. Israel regularly violated Lebanese sovereignty and airspace; Hezbollah quickly rearmed and built an extensive military infrastructure in southern Lebanon; the Lebanese army has never been deployed; and UN troops were given only a symbolic mandate.

In principle, the current ceasefire is not dramatically different from 1701. The Israeli army is expected to withdraw from southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah withdraws its fighters and weapons from the border area, some thirty kilometers north of the Litani -river. A 60-day ceasefire will follow, during which the Lebanese army will send about 5,000 troops to the border and join the existing UN peacekeeping force. During this transition phase, Lebanon and Israel, with international assistance, will negotiate the crucial issue of land border demarcation to remove a major source of friction between them.

This sounds like déjà vu, right? After all, Hezbollah has not been disarmed and retains sufficient combat capacity to hurt Israel and prevent the residents of the north from returning to their homes – a key objective of the Israeli government; Israel has the green light from the US to attack the group whenever it sees fit; and it is not at all clear whether the role of the Lebanese army and the UN force will be more effective this time. This also assumes that the Lebanese army gets the financial support it desperately needs from friendly international powers, including the US, France and Britain, to deploy adequately (the Lebanese government cannot provide that kind of financing due to the economic collapse of the country).

Some will point to the fact that a new and more robust monitoring mechanism, in which the US and France act as arbiters, will make a return to arms between Israel and Hezbollah less likely. Such diplomatic muscle underpinning the agreement could be useful, but I don’t think it will be a decisive or transformative factor.

Indeed, the improved diplomatic structure of 1701 is not the real reason why things look different this time. Instead, it is the entire strategic environment that has changed significantly, largely to Israel’s advantage, as a result of its ruthless military machine and near-unconditional American support. Israel has never used its military power in this way, nor has Washington given it such unconditional support.

Hezbollah and its ally Iran will never admit it, but they have suffered a strategic setback. Their goal was to connect all the regional battlefields where Iran had leverage to bleed and overwhelm Israel. But Israel has blocked that goal with brute force, quite successfully.

Until recently, Hezbollah’s condition for stopping its attacks was that Israel end its campaign against Hamas. But by agreeing to the terms of the ceasefire, which clearly separates Lebanon from Gaza, Hezbollah has essentially abandoned Hamas and with it the very idea of ​​strategic interdependence, at least for now.

Hezbollah did not come to this conclusion alone. Iran saw its ally being battered by Israel and, like a good corner in a boxing match, threw in the towel to avoid having its boxer crushed.

Of course, none of this means that Israel has won a lasting victory, or that Iran will not find a way to rehabilitate its regional network of militias. But this time, given the extent of the damage, physical and psychological, that Israel has inflicted on its adversaries, it will take much longer than before. Risk-averse Iran should also think twice about how Israel might respond to the crisis attempt to revive its regional strategy.

Donald Trump, the newly elected president, will maintain American support for Israel, but he will return to the Oval Office in January with a desire to end wars in the Middle East (and possibly Ukraine). If his goal is to expedite a peace deal while isolating Iran and its allies, there is no better way to achieve that than through the expansion of the Abraham Accords, which Trump signed. can take credit for starting in his first term.

An expanded Abraham Accord could ultimately grant the Palestinians an independent state and normalize relations between Saudi Arabia (and thus the Arab and Islamic world) and the Jewish state. That kind of peace will be far more powerful and lasting than any temporary deterrent that Israel will create through military force.

• Bilal Y Saab, associate fellow at Chatham House, heads the US-Middle East practice of Trends Research & Advisory

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